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Abstract
We consider three games, Symmetric Battle of the Sexes, Modified Battle of the Sexes and
Chicken and two diﬀerent correlation devices, public and private, with the same expected payoﬀs
in equilibrium, which is also the best correlated equilibrium payoﬀ for these games. Despite our
choices of the payoﬀs in these games based on some theoretical criteria, we find that coordination
and following recommendations vary significantly among our treatments. We explain these diﬀer-
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1 INTRODUCTION
Many games of economic interest involve multiple (pure) Nash equilibria and it is therefore important
to understand how, if at all, individuals coordinate to play a particular equilibrium outcome. This
problem of equilibrium selection has been theoretically analysed using diﬀerent criteria, such as, payoﬀ-
dominance, perfection, properness and risk-dominance (see van Damme 1987, Harsanyi and Selten 1988
and Myerson 1991, for details). The issues of multiple equilibria and coordination in games have also
been one of the major themes of research in experimental economics (Cooper et al. 1989, 1990; Van
Huyck et al. 1990, 1991). In the last two decades, a growing literature of experimental research
suggests that individuals indeed are able to coordinate on a naturally selected outcome if they are
helped to do so using some suitably chosen scheme.1 The experimental literature also suggests that in
games with multiple symmetric equilibria in which no outcome can be naturally selected (such as the
Battle of the Sexes, henceforth, BoS), individuals fail to coordinate unless the game has an intrinsic
feature, such as, risk-dominance (Cabrales et al. 2000) or there is a way to distinguish one of the
outcomes (Van Huyck et al. 1992; Cooper et al. 1989, 1990, 1992; Straub, 1995).2
Seemingly orthogonal to the above literature on coordination, there is also a recent however thin
literature (Moreno and Wooders 1998; Cason and Sharma 2007; Duﬀy and Feltovich 2010) on exper-
iments with correlated devices a la Aumann (1974, 1987) that recommend strategies to the players
according to a probability distribution. Clearly, any convex combination (public lottery) over pure
Nash equilibrium outcomes can be viewed as a correlated equilibrium. Thus, combining the results
from these two strands of literature, respectively on coordination and correlation, one may easily
conjecture that in a symmetric 2 x 2 game like BoS, individuals can avoid coordination-failure by
following a correlation device that randomly selects one of the two pure Nash equilibria. Indeed, such
a conjecture has been confirmed as a result for this (public) correlated equilibrium in the game of
Chicken by Cason and Sharma (2007) and Duﬀy and Feltovich (2010), and in other relevant papers
on coordination.3
1Costless messages, announcements (Brandts and Macleod 1995; Blume 1998; Clark et al. 2001; Blume and Ortmann
2007; Manzini et al. 2009), information on other individuals’ choices (Charness and Grosskopf 2004), history of play
and observation of others’ actions (Duﬀy and Feltovich 2002, 2006; Schmidt et al. 2003), attractiveness of the payoﬀ-
dominant outcome (Battalio et al. 2001) and advice on the desirable outcomes (Croson and Marks 2001; Chaudhuri et
al. 2009; Chaudhuri and Paichayontvijit 2010), can facilitate coordination (see Devetag and Ortmann 2007 for a survey).
2Cheap-talk (as in Farrell 1987) and any pre-play non-binding communication can significantly improve coordination
in games like BoS (Cooper et al. 1989; Crawford 1998; Costa-Gomes 2002; Camerer 2003; Burton et al. 2005).
3Duﬀy and Fisher (2005) introduced sunspots as coordination devices using randomisation over equilibria. Stahl
(2009) and Camera et al. (2010) used randomised messages for cooperation in Prisoners’ Dilemma, while Brandts and
McLeod (1995) and Seely et al. (2005) analysed public recommendations. Experiments on public information (McKelvey
and Page 1990; Marimon et al. 1993; McCabe et al. 2000; Anctil et al. 2004; Heinemann et al. 2004) are also related.
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We, in this paper, take this connection between two strands of literature (on coordination and
correlation) further by questioning the robustness of the above conjecture. We ask whether individuals
coordinate in the same fashion in any 2 x 2 game similar to the BoS, using a public lottery that
selects one of the two pure symmetric equilibria at random. To answer this question, we consider three
diﬀerent symmetric 2 x 2 games, each with two (pure) symmetric Nash equilibria (denoted by ( )
and () in our games) and two other outcomes (denoted by () and (  ) here). The games
we use are identical in structure and diﬀer just in one outcome, (  ). There is no natural way to
coordinate on one of the two pure Nash equilibria (( ) and ()) in these games. Two games
are common in the literature, namely, Symmetric BoS and Chicken, while the third lies in between (in
terms of the payoﬀs from the outcome (  )) that we call the Modified BoS. As the games have the
same structure and the same pure Nash equilibrium payoﬀs, our first prediction is that coordination
achieved using a public lottery does not vary over these three games (Hypothesis 1).
Moreover, following the literature on correlation, we choose two diﬀerent correlation devices for
the game of Chicken. The first one, as explained, is a public lottery with equal probabilities over the
two pure Nash equilibria of the games, ( ) and (). We formally call this randomised scheme a
public correlation device. The second correlation device randomly selects three outcomes of the games,
( ), () and (  ) with equal probabilities (13) . Clearly, this device involves a simple posterior
distribution (of equal probabilities) given the recommendation  for an individual over the two possible
recommendations for the other individual. We call this device the private correlation device. These
two correlation devices have already been tested and compared in the literature (Cason and Sharma
2007 and Duﬀy and Feltovich 2010) to analyse players’ behaviour of following recommendations from
diﬀerent types of correlation devices for the game of Chicken. However, these papers do not oﬀer any
specific reasons behind the choices of the payoﬀs in the game of Chicken. Therefore, not surprisingly
perhaps, these papers found that diﬀerent recommendations, involving diﬀerent conditional expected
returns, were followed with very diﬀerent rates.
We choose two correlated equilibria (public and private) to have the same expected payoﬀs (when
recommendations are followed) in all these games and also to be the best correlated equilibria in terms
of ex ante expected payoﬀs for the corresponding games. Moreover, for the game of Chicken, we
maintain the same conditional expected payoﬀs for the two recommendations ( and  ) from the
private device. Unlike other papers in the literature, we have chosen the payoﬀs in our games based
on these theoretical criteria (Criteria 1 − 6 in Section 2). Hence we expect no diﬀerences among our
games in terms of following recommendations (Hypothesis 2). Moreover, our choice of the payoﬀs
in the game of Chicken theoretically confirms that there should not be any diﬀerence in following a
particular recommendation from the private device (Hypothesis 3).
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Our experimental design consists of four diﬀerent treatments in total. Two treatments are assigned
to the game of Chicken, one with the private device and the other with the public device; two other
treatments use the public device for the two versions of the BoS. This experimental design with four
treatments allows us to analyse the issues we are interested in: the eﬀects of public randomisation on
coordination (by comparing all three games with the public device), and the impact of diﬀerent corre-
lation devices on individuals’ play (by comparing two treatments involving the game of Chicken). Note
that we do not compare the eﬀect of diﬀerent correlation devices for the two BoS games as the private
device is not a correlated equilibrium for these games. We already know from the literature (Cason and
Sharma 2007 and Duﬀy and Feltovich 2010) that individuals do not usually follow recommendations
from a correlation device that is not a correlated equilibrium.
In line with the existing literature on correlation, we do find that individuals achieve coordination
by following recommendations from the public device; for example, 93% of all the recommendations
from the public device have been followed in the Symmetric BoS and for this game, individuals actually
coordinated in almost 88% of the cases. However, despite the theoretical choices of our payoﬀs, we
find that coordination and following recommendations are not robust to our treatment variations and
we reject Hypotheses 1 and 2.
Our main finding is that coordination and following recommendations vary significantly between
the games of Symmetric BoS and Chicken. We find individuals follow recommendations (from a public
device) and coordinate more in the Symmetric BoS than in the game of Chicken. At first sight, these
diﬀerences in achieving coordination and following recommendations may appear to be surprising.
However, our results can be explained by considering the observations where the recommendations are
followed and when they are not followed.
We also find that individuals do follow the recommendation of strategy  more than  in the
game of Chicken with the private device, rejecting Hypothesis 3. On the other hand, recommendation
of strategy  is more followed than  in the Symmetric BoS. In the game of Chicken, players may be
“procedurally rational” (Osborne and Rubinstein 1998) and may find the strategy  more attractive
than the strategy , even though the conditional expected gains from following are the same.
We analyse the observations when the recommendations from the public device in these games
are not followed. A pair of individuals may not both follow their recommendations and may still
coordinate. However, when exactly one of the individuals in a pair does not follow, the outcomes may
either be () or (  ), regardless of their recommendations. Individuals may try to “coordinate”
to achieve the outcome (  ), as a “fair” and “cooperative” outcome, particularly in the game of
Chicken. This interpretation does match with our findings. Result 4 confirms that the frequency of
(  ) is significantly higher in Chicken than that in the Symmetric BoS.
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2 MODEL
2.1 Correlated Equilibrium
The concepts below are well-established in the literature, following the seminal work of Aumann (1974,
1987). We are presenting the definitions and notations we need in this paper (as presented in Ray
2002 and Ray and Sen Gupta 2013), just for the sake of completeness.
Fix any finite normal form game,  = [ {}∈  {}∈ ], with set of players,  = {1  },
finite pure strategy sets, 1   with  =Q∈ , and payoﬀ functions, 1  ,  :  → <, for
all .
Definition 1 A (direct) correlation device  is a probability distribution over .
A normal form game, , can be extended by using a direct correlation device. For correlation a la
Aumann (1974, 1987), the device first selects a strategy profile  (= (1  )) according to , and
then sends the private recommendation  to each player . The extended game  is the game where
the correlation device  selects and sends recommendations to the players, and then the players play
the original game .
Definition 2 Given a direct correlation device , a strategy profile  (= (1  )), is called a
public recommendation, if ()  0, and the conditional probability of (−) given  is 1 for all . A
direct correlation device  is called a public device if for all  ∈ , either () = 0 or  is a public
recommendation.
Given a normal form game, , and a correlation device,  , a (pure) strategy for player  in
the game  is a map  :  →  and the corresponding (ex-ante, expected) payoﬀ is given by,
∗ (1  ) = P∈ ()(1(1)  ()). The obedient strategy profile is the identity map
∗ () = , for all , with payoﬀ to player  given by ∗ (∗) =
P
∈ ()(). The device is called a
correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1974, 1987) if all the players follow the recommended strategies, i.e.,
the obedient strategy profile constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the extended game . Formally, with
the notation − ∈ − =Q 6=  ,
Definition 3  is a (direct) correlated equilibrium of the game  if P−∈− ( −)( −) ≥P
−∈− ( −)( −), for all , for all ,  ∈ .
For any normal form game , let () denote the set of all distributions that correspond to
any pure Nash equilibrium point and  () denote any convex combination of several pure Nash
equilibria. Let () denote the set of all direct correlated equilibria of a given game , while  ()
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denote the set of all direct correlated equilibria that are also public devices. It is obvious that any
public direct correlated equilibrium must assign positive probabilities only on Nash equilibrium points.
Hence, formally, () ⊆  () ⊆  () ⊆ ().
2.2 Games
In this paper, we use two well-studied 2 x 2 normal form games, namely the games of Chicken and the
BoS. We first consider a parametric version of the two-person game of Chicken as presented in Kar et
al. (2010) shown in Table 1 below, where,       . Each of the two players has two strategies,
namely,  and  .
 
    
    
Table 1: The Parametric Version of the Game of Chicken
The above game has two pure Nash equilibria, namely, ( ) and (), and a mixed Nash
equilibrium in which each player plays  with probability (−)(−)+(−) .
We now present the two-person game of BoS, keeping it close to the above structure as much as
possible, for the sake of comparing our results from these two games. Using the same parametric
notations as in the game of Chicken, we construct a two-player game of BoS, as shown in Table 2
below, where  ≤ ´    . Here as well, each of the two players has two strategies, namely,  and
 . We call this game the Symmetric BoS when  = ´ and the Modified BoS when   ´.
 
    
   ´ ´
Table 2: The Parametric Version of the Game of BoS
Like the game of Chicken, this game also has two pure Nash equilibria, namely, ( ) and (),
and a mixed Nash equilibrium in which each player plays  with probability (−´)(−´)+(−) .
2.3 Correlation Devices
As explained earlier in the Introduction, we focus on two particular direct correlation devices. The
first one, as shown in Table 3 below, is a public device, following Definition 2.
6
 
 0 12
 12 0
Table 3: The Public Device
Clearly, this correlation device is a direct correlated equilibrium for any parametric version of the
games of Chicken and (Symmetric and Modified) BoS described above, as it is a convex combination
of two pure Nash equilibria, ( ) and (), in either of these games. In the rest of the paper, we
refer to this specific correlation device as the public device. The second correlation device we analyse
is shown in Table 4 below.
 
 0 13
 13 13
Table 4: The Private Device
This direct correlation device obviously is not a public device. Note that the posterior probabilities
given the recommendation  are ( 12  12) and hence are easy to understand and interpret. In the rest of
the paper, we refer to this specific correlation device as the private device. This correlation device is
a direct correlated equilibrium for Chicken with certain restrictions on the parameters, by Definition
3. This equilibrium will be used in this paper for the game of Chicken only, as we will explain later.
We now characterise the direct correlated equilibrium that maximises the sum of the expected
payoﬀs, often called the utilitarian correlated equilibrium, for these two games.
It is clear that for the games of Symmetric and Modified BoS, regardless of the specific values of
the parameters, any convex combination of the two pure Nash equilibria corresponds to a utilitarian
correlated equilibrium, with the sum of the expected payoﬀs (+ ).
Similarly, for the game of Chicken, under  +   2, any element of  () of the game
corresponds to a utilitarian correlated equilibrium with the sum of the expected payoﬀs ( + ). To
characterise the utilitarian correlated equilibrium for the game of Chicken under +   2, consider
the direct symmetric correlation device (following Kar et al. 2010) with 0    12 , as in Table 5.
 
 0 
  1− 2
Table 5: The Utilitarian Correlated Equilibrium for the Game of Chicken
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It can be checked that the above device is a direct correlated equilibrium for any parametric
version of the game of Chicken when (−)(−)+2(−) ≤  ( 12), using Definition 3. The payoﬀ from this
correlated equilibrium to either of the players is −(2− −), which is decreasing in  if and only if
2− −   0. Hence, under +   2, the utilitarian correlated equilibrium of the game of Chicken
is characterised by a device as in Table 5 with  = (−)(−)+2(−) . Consequently, for a game of Chicken
with + = 2, the utilitarian correlated equilibrium is not unique. Indeed any element of  ()
and any device as above with (−)(−)+2(−) ≤   12 is a utilitarian correlated equilibrium of the game.
2.4 Parameters
We now choose specific values of the parameters for our games of Chicken and (Symmetric and Modi-
fied) BoS satisfying certain criteria so that the public and private devices described above are appro-
priate for our analysis.
As we are going to use both the public and private devices for Chicken, we first impose some
restrictions on the parameters of Chicken for our purposes. We start oﬀ with a stronger criterion than
the standard requirement for the correlated equilibrium (as in Definition 3), stated below.
Criterion 1 For the game of Chicken, the private device is a correlated equilibrium and the equilibrium
conditions (incentive constraints) are satisfied with strict inequalities.
For the above criterion to hold, we need  +    + , or,  −    − . Note that the other
equilibrium constraint is satisfied with strict inequality anyway, as   , in our game of Chicken.
Also, this restriction is automatically satisfied for the public devices by the structure of the public
device and the games considered here. Criterion 1 for the private device makes sure that individuals
are not indiﬀerent over following or not following a recommended strategy in the game of Chicken.
Criterion 2 For the game of Chicken with the private device (at equilibrium), the conditional expected
gains in payoﬀs from following a recommendation are the same, for both possible recommendations, 
and  .
Criterion 2 can be translated as the expected payoﬀ from playing  given the recommendation
 minus the expected payoﬀ from playing  given  is equal to the expected payoﬀ from  given
 minus the expected payoﬀ from  given  . From the analysis in the previous subsection, for this
criterion to hold, we require  −  = 3( − ). This criterion allows us to compare the results from
two diﬀerent recommendations for the private device in the game of Chicken. Note that we have not
imposed such a criterion on the public device as the recommendations are symmetric for such a device.
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Our next criterion requires that the expected payoﬀs from the diﬀerent games and correlated
equilibria we consider should be the same so that the results from three diﬀerent games and two
diﬀerent equilibria can be compared. Moreover, the criterion enforces that we achieve the best possible
correlated equilibrium payoﬀs in our set-up.
Criterion 3 For the game of Chicken, both the public and the private devices are the utilitarian
correlated equilibrium for the game (and have the same expected payoﬀs). For the games of Symmetric
and Modified BoS, the public device is the utilitarian correlated equilibrium for the game with the same
expected payoﬀ as in the public and the private device for the game of Chicken.
From the analysis in the previous subsection on the game of Chicken, it is clear that for Criterion
3 to hold, we must have 2 =  +  and +2 = ++3 (which also implies 2 =  + ). Note that
the private device cannot be the utilitarian correlated equilibrium for the games of Symmetric and
Modified BoS as it picks a (Pareto-) dominated outcome, (  ), with a positive probability and this
is why we do not use the private device for the BoS.
Criterion 3 above also makes sure that correlation is better than independent individual randomi-
sation, that is, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium payoﬀ is strictly less than the payoﬀs from the
(public and private) devices we consider.
Our next criterion is indeed about mixed strategy equilibrium of the game and it requires that a
naive randomisation with equal probability over two pure strategies does not constitute an equilibrium
behaviour in the game.
Criterion 4 The (mixed) strategy of (12  12) does not constitute the mixed Nash equilibrium in the
games of Chicken and (Symmetric and Modified) BoS.
Note that Criterion 4 follows from Criterion 1 for the game of Chicken. As +   + , playing
 is strictly better than playing , against the opponent’s (mixed) strategy of ( 12  12), in the game
of Chicken. Similarly, for any parameter values, playing  is always strictly better than playing  ,
against the opponent’s (mixed) strategy of ( 12  12) in the game of Symmetric BoS.
In order to avoid the possible eﬀect of individuals’ aversion for negative and zero payoﬀs in exper-
iments, we restrict our parameters to be (strictly) positive. Formally,
Criterion 5   0.
Finally, we also impose the following restriction on our game of Chicken.
Criterion 6 For the game of Chicken,  is suﬃciently high, i.e., −   0.
9
Criterion 6 deserves a clarifying remark. Although (  ) is not a Nash equilibrium in the game
of Chicken as long as   , the strategy of playing  may appear to be a weakly dominant strategy,
when −  is small. We thus have imposed the restriction stated in Criterion 6.
We now claim that the games of Chicken and the Symmetric BoS can be identified by two parame-
ters, namely,  ( 0) and  ( 0), only. From Criterion 3, we need (− ) = (− ) =  (say). Then,
from Criterion 2, we must have (−) = 3, which satisfies Criterion 1 as well. Hence, the parameters
that satisfy Criteria 1, 2 and 3 are   0,  = + 3,  = +  = + 4 and  = +  = + 5.
It is easy to confirm that the expected payoﬀs from the public device for the games of Symmetric
and Modified BoS and the expected payoﬀs from the private and public devices for the game of Chicken
are all equal to + 4.
Given these parameters, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for the game of Chicken turns out
to be (14  34) regardless of the specific values of  and , as (−)(−)+(−) = +3 = 14 . Similarly, for the
Symmetric BoS, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is (58  38), regardless of  and . Finally, for the
Modified BoS, in the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, the probability of playing  is 5−(´−)8−(´−) .
For the Modified BoS, we need to choose ´ such that ´   = +4, or, ´−  4. However, note
that if ´ =  + 2 (that is, ´ −  = 2) then the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for the Modified
BoS is indeed playing  (or  ) with probability 12 . Hence, ´ should not be equal to + 2 to satisfy
Criterion 4.
We now present the chosen values of  ( 0, to satisfy Criterion 5) and  ( 0, to meet Criterion
6), for our experiment. We take  = 2 and  = 3. Thus, our game of Chicken is as shown in Table 6
below.
 
 2 2 17 11
 11 17 14 14
Table 6: The Game of Chicken
We then use the same parameter values to identify the game of Symmetric BoS as indicated above.
Thus, our game of Symmetric BoS is as shown in Table 7 below.
 
 2 2 17 11
 11 17 2 2
Table 7: The Game of Symmetric BoS
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Finally, the game of Modified BoS can be identified by choosing an appropriate ´, with 2  ´  14.
One would like to choose a value in the middle of admissible range, however, ´ can not be equal to
+ 2 (= 8, here). We have chosen ´ = 7. Thus, our game of Modified BoS is as shown in Table 8.
 
 2 2 17 11
 11 17 7 7
Table 8: The Game of Modified BoS
In all three games, the two pure Nash equilibrium payoﬀs are (17 11) and (11 17). The mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium payoﬀs for the games of Symmetric BoS, Chicken and Modified BoS respec-
tively are (618  618 ), ( 534  534 ) and (17319  17319 ). As noted earlier, the expected payoﬀs from the public device
for the games of Symmetric and Modified BoS and the expected payoﬀs from the private and public
devices for the game of Chicken are all the same and equal to (14 14), which is higher than the mixed
Nash equilibrium payoﬀs in all the games.
A remark is in order regarding our choice of the values of , ´ and , and thus, our specific payoﬀs
in the games. One may argue that the chosen value of  (= −  = 3) in the game of Chicken, is not
big enough (Criterion 6); however, we believe that this value of  is suﬃcient to make the strategy 
not weakly dominated by the strategy  , for our experiment.
3 EXPERIMENT
3.1 Design and Procedures
As already mentioned in the previous section, we use three diﬀerent games, namely, the games of
Chicken, Symmetric BoS and Modified BoS, and two diﬀerent correlation devices, namely, the public
device and the private device. The public device is used with all three games to compare coordination
in diﬀerent games; however, the private device is used only for the game of Chicken to compare the
eﬀect of diﬀerent correlation devices within one game.
Note that we do not have any treatment on any particular game without correlation devices,
as a possible benchmark. Such a benchmark has already been covered in the existing literatures on
coordination (for example, by Cooper et al. 1989, for the game of BoS) and on correlation (for example,
by Duﬀy and Feltovich 2010, for the game of Chicken). The main purpose of our paper is to analyse
the robustness of coordination by following recommendations in diﬀerent games. In total, we thus have
four experimental treatments. These are: the Symmetric Battle of the Sexes game with the public
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device (Symmetric-BoS ), the Modified Battle of the Sexes game with the public device (Modified-BoS),
the game of Chicken with the public device (Chicken-Public) and the game of Chicken with the private
device (Chicken-Private). The games and the devices in each treatment are summarised below.
Symmetric-BoS Modified-BoS
 
 2 2 17 11
 11 17 2 2
 
 0 12
 12 0
 
 2 2 17 11
 11 17 7 7
 
 0 12
 12 0
Mixed NE strategy: ( 58  38); payoﬀ: 618 ' 763 Mixed NE strategy: (1019  1019); payoﬀ: 17319 ' 911
Player’s payoﬀ when device is followed: 14 Player’s payoﬀ when device is followed: 14
Chicken-Public Chicken-Private
 
 2 2 17 11
 11 17 14 14
 
 0 12
 12 0
 
 2 2 17 11
 11 17 14 14
 
 0 13
 13 13
Mixed NE strategy: (14  34); payoﬀ: 534 = 1325 Mixed NE strategy: (14  34); payoﬀ: 534 = 1325
Player’s payoﬀ when device is followed: 14 Player’s payoﬀ when device is followed: 14
Table 9: Overview of Experimental Treatments
We used the so-called “between subjects” design. In any of our experimental sessions, only one of the
four treatments was run. For each of the treatments, we used 6 matching groups, each comprising of 8
subjects (i.e., 4 pairs). Each treatment lasted for 20 rounds. Because of the likely dependencies between
decisions made within matching groups, we took one matching group as our unit of observations and
treated these observations as independent data points for performing all our statistical tests.
We randomly re-matched the subjects in every round in order to create an environment as close
as possible to a one-period interaction between subjects. Subjects were informed that they had been
randomly paired with participants, diﬀerent from one round to the next; however, they were not aware
of the identity of the subjects they were matched with. The same matching protocol was used in all
matching groups. The overview of the experimental design is summarised in Table 10 below.
Treatment Game Device #Indep. Obs. #Subjects #Rounds
Symmetric-BoS Symmetric BoS Public 6 8 x 6 = 48 20
Modified-BoS Modified BoS Public 6 8 x 6 = 48 20
Chicken-Public Chicken Public 6 8 x 6 = 48 20
Chicken-Private Chicken Private 6 8 x 6 = 48 20
Table 10: Experimental Design
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All sessions used an identical protocol. At the beginning of a session, subjects were seated and given
a set of written instructions. We report the full instructions only for the Chicken-Private treatment
in the Appendix of this paper. The instructions for other treatments are similar to those in Chicken-
Private and hence have been omitted and are available upon request.
All subjects in a session had identical instructions and were given five minutes to read the written
instructions and then, after reading the instructions, a few minutes to complete a brief comprehen-
sion test (see Appendix), to ensure that they have understood the instructions, before starting the
experiment itself. When the subjects had done the test, we went round to them individually to make
sure that they had all the answers correct. The experiment did not proceed until every subject had
the correct answers to these questions. Subjects were not allowed to communicate with one another
throughout the session, except via the decisions they made during the experiment.
Notice that all our games can be described without assigning the subjects to be a row or a column
player. Hence, each pair of subjects was described as “you and your counterpart”. Note also that we
used a neutral terminology and avoided using any term that may have some other connotations, such
as, “your opponent” or “your partner”. Subjects were not given identifying information about their
counterparts in any round to avoid any subject-specific reputation that may develop across the rounds.
At the beginning of a round, subjects were shown the payoﬀ matrix corresponding to a game
(depending on the treatment), along with their recommended action, which was randomly drawn from
the appropriate probability distribution given by the device. We used a neutral framing to oﬀer the
recommendations by using the phrase “it is recommended that you choose ...”. We also clearly explain
(see the instructions in the Appendix) the probability distribution, the conditional probabilities and
the expected payoﬀs in simple terms.
For any treatment, in all its sessions, we used the same random sequence of recommendations to
reduce across-subject variation. After the subjects decided which action to choose, they were provided
with the feedback on their own recommendation, own chosen action, counterpart’s recommendation,
counterpart’s chosen action, own payoﬀ and counterpart’s payoﬀ, after each round. Subjects were also
given a record sheet (see Appendix) to keep track of the feedback information from previous rounds.
At the end of round 20, the experimental session ended. Subjects were asked to complete a brief
on-screen questionnaire with some supplementary background information and then privately paid
according to their point earnings from all 20 rounds, using an exchange rate of £003 per point.
Average earnings per treatment were as follows: £753 for Symmetric-BoS, £729 for Modified-BoS,
£782 for Chicken-Public and £750 for Chicken-Private.4
4There was no show-up fee for our experiment. Sessions lasted, on average, for 40 minutes. Our average payment
over all treatments, $754 (approximately $12) is higher than student-jobs in the UK that oﬀer about $700 per hour.
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The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). All
the sessions were conducted at the laboratory of the Centre for Experimental Economics (EXEC) at
the University of York. The subjects were recruited, using the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004), from
various fields of studies of the University of York, including, but certainly not confined to, Economics
or other Social Sciences.
3.2 Hypotheses
In this subsection, we formally present our theoretical hypotheses, following the set-up in Section 2.
First of all, based on the existing literatures on coordination and correlation, we can predict that
individuals do follow the recommendations from the public device to coordinate on Nash outcomes in
all three games. Our set-up from the previous section suggests that we should expect the rates of this
coordination among the games, Symmetric BoS, Modified BoS and Chicken will be similar. Our first
null hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1 The level of coordination achieved, using the public device, does not vary across the
three games (Symmetric BoS, Modified BoS and Chicken).
Having posed the first hypothesis, we also would like to formally test whether the frequencies of
following recommendations vary among all our four treatments, using two diﬀerent types of correlation
devices. As we have chosen the parameters in the games (using Criterion 3) to maintain the same
expected payoﬀs (when recommendations are followed) in all four treatments. Hence, our second null
hypothesis is as follows.
Hypothesis 2 There is no diﬀerence in the rates of following recommendations among four treat-
ments.
We will test null hypotheses 1 and 2 against the respective alternatives that following recommen-
dations and coordination diﬀer among treatments. In particular, an alternative hypothesis is that
coordination (and also following recommendations) is higher in (either version of) the BoS than in
the game of Chicken. As explained in the Introduction, this alternative is based on the fact that
individuals may wish to achieve the outcome (  ) in the game of Chicken. Also, the alternative
hypothesis suggests that there may be diﬀerences in following recommendations from the public and
private correlation devices in the game of Chicken.
Finally, Criterion 2 implies that for the game of Chicken using the private device, both recommen-
dations,  and  , should be equally followed. Thus, our last null hypothesis is as follows.
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Hypothesis 3 There is no diﬀerence between following recommendations  and  in the game of
Chicken.
A possible alternative hypothesis to the above null hypothesis 3 is that recommendation  will
be followed more than  in the game of Chicken. As discussed in the Introduction, in the game of
Chicken, strategy  may be viewed as a weakly dominant strategy, under this alternative.
4 RESULTS
In this section, we present our findings from the experiment and subsequently test our hypotheses.
4.1 Hypothesis 1: Coordination
We first consider “coordination” in the first three treatments, namely, Symmetric-BoS, Modified-BoS
and Chicken-Public, in which the public device has been used. We look at paired observations to
measure “coordination” in the outcomes of the games. We define “coordination” as the union of the
Nash equilibrium outcomes ( ) and () (i.e., #( ) + #()). We present, in Table 11
below, the average frequencies of coordination over 20 periods, divided into five equal four-period
blocks for each of the first three treatments separately.
Treatment/%Coordination in Periods 1− 4 5− 8 9− 12 13− 16 17− 20 Total
Symmetric-BoS 8021 8646 8958 9479 8854 8792
Modified-BoS 7188 7500 8542 8750 8438 8083
Chicken-Public 6146 6042 6667 6667 7083 6521
Table 11: Average Frequencies of Coordination Using the Public Device in Games
From Table 11, we observe that the average frequency of coordination over 20 periods is quite high
for all three games.5 Table 11 clearly indicates that the frequencies of coordination for (both versions
of) the BoS are higher than those in the game of Chicken.
We now formally examine whether these diﬀerences in the observed frequencies in our treatments
are significant or not. We present our analysis in two parts. First, we use a couple of non-parametric
tests, namely, Kruskal-Wallis test and Wilcoxon ranksum test.
5We are not reporting the frequencies of coordination for the Chicken-Private treatment as the private device (which
is assumed to be followed) recommends the players to play the outcome (  ) with probability 1
3
. For the sake of
completeness, the overall average frequency of Coordination in Chicken-Private is only 5208%.
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Based on a Kruskal-Wallis test, we find that the frequencies of coordination are significantly diﬀerent
across treatments (-value = 00001). We then run a Wilcoxon ranksum test, performed for each
pairwise comparison. Table 12 below reports the corresponding -values for each pairwise comparison.
Treatment (Average Frequency of Coordination) Symmetric-BoS Modified-BoS
Symmetric-BoS (8792%) −
Modified-BoS (8083%) 00776 −
Chicken-Public (6521%) 00104 00364
Table 12: -values for Diﬀerences in Coordination for Each Pair of Treatments
From Table 12, we find significant diﬀerences among all the three games (treatments) in this respect,
at least at 10% level of significance (the game of Chicken is diﬀerent from the two versions of BoS at
5% level of significance), thus indicating a rejection of our first null hypothesis.
As the non-parametric statistical tests do not control for other characteristics that may aﬀect an
individual’s decision, we also use multivariate regressions to test the robustness of Hypothesis 1.
To assess the diﬀerences in Coordination among the above three treatments, we run a Probit
regression with robust standard errors clustered on independent matching groups, using 1440 (24 x 20
x 3) paired observations from 20 periods of three treatments pooled together.
In this Probit regression, our dependent variable is a binary variable called Coordination, which
takes value 1 if the paired observation is either ( ) or () and takes 0, otherwise. We have used
the Symmetric-BoS treatment as the baseline for comparison. Our main independent variables are
two dummy variables called ModifiedBoS and ChickenPublic, each of which takes a value of 1 if the
paired observation belongs to the corresponding treatment and 0 otherwise. The variable Period takes
integer values from 1 to 20 for diﬀerent rounds, while the variable PairedRecommendation is a binary
variable that takes value 0 when the recommendations for the matched pair is ( ) and 1 when it is
() (note that these are the only possible paired recommendations from the public device). Finally,
ModifiedBoS*Period and ChickenPublic*Period are the products of two named variables to capture
the interaction between the respective treatment and period.
Table 13 presents the marginal eﬀects from this Probit regression.
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Dependent Variable: Coordination = 1, if ( ) or (); = 0, otherwise
Number of Observations: 1440; Pseudo 2 = 00640
Independent Variables Marginal Eﬀects Robust Standard Errors -values
ModifiedBoS −007 007 0263
ChickenPublic −018∗ 010 0074
Period 001∗∗ 000 0030
ModifiedBoS*Period −000 001 0775
ChickenPublic*Period −001 001 0273
PairedRecommendation 005∗∗ 003 0046
Note: ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level and ∗∗∗ at 1% the level.
Table 13: Probit Regression on Diﬀerences in Coordination Among Treatments
Table 13 clearly indicates significant diﬀerences between treatments Symmetric-BoS and Chicken-
Public. Our Hypothesis 1 thus has been rejected as we find supporting evidence for the alternative
hypothesis that individuals coordinate more in the game of Symmetric BoS than in the game of
Chicken. We summarise our main finding below.
Result 1 There are significant diﬀerences in coordination by following the public device between the
games of Symmetric BoS and Chicken; individuals coordinate significantly more in Symmetric
BoS than in Chicken.
4.2 Hypothesis 2: Following recommendations
As mentioned earlier, from the literature on correlation (Cason and Sharma 2007, Duﬀy and Feltovich
2010) we expect that individuals actually follow their recommendations from a correlated equilibrium.
Based on our choices of the games and the devices, we also hypothesise (Hypothesis 2) that the rate of
following should not vary among our four treatments. We check whether or not this is indeed the case.
In Figure 1, we present the average frequencies of the subjects who followed their recommendations,
over 20 periods in five equal four-period blocks, in all four treatments.
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Figure 1: Average Frequencies of Following Recommendations in all Treatments
Table 14 below shows the exact frequencies plotted above and also the frequencies of following two
diﬀerent recommendations,  and  , in each treatment.
Treatment/%Following in Periods 1− 4 5− 8 9− 12 13− 16 17− 20 Total
Symmetric-BoS (Follow ) 9063 9688 9792 10000 9479 9604
Symmetric-BoS (Follow  ) 8542 8750 8958 9479 9375 9021
Symmetric-BoS (Follow All) 8802 9219 9375 9740 9427 9313
Modified-BoS (Follow ) 8229 8542 9063 9375 9375 8917
Modified-BoS (Follow  ) 8125 8125 9271 9375 9063 8792
Modified-BoS (Follow All) 8177 8333 9167 9375 9219 8854
Chicken-Public (Follow ) 6042 6667 7083 7292 7500 6917
Chicken-Public (Follow  ) 8438 8542 8958 9167 8750 8771
Chicken-Public (Follow All) 7240 7604 8021 8229 8125 7844
Chicken-Private (Follow ) 6944 7222 7727 5256 5667 6515
Chicken-Private (Follow  ) 8167 7101 7381 7456 7652 7540
Chicken-Private (Follow All) 7708 7135 7500 6563 7031 7188
Table 14: Average Frequencies of Following Diﬀerent Recommendations in all Treatments
The average frequencies of following recommendations are indeed quite high in all treatments, as
we expected. However, Table 14 indicates that there are diﬀerences in following recommendations
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among our treatments; individuals follow recommendations more in both versions of the BoS than in
either treatments involving the game of Chicken, suggesting a rejection of our Hypothesis 2.
We now test Hypothesis 2 more formally. A Kruskal-Wallis test suggests that the frequencies
of following recommendations across treatments are significantly diﬀerent from each other (-value
= 00001). We then run a Wilcoxon ranksum test for each pairwise comparison, -values from which
are presented in Table 15 below.
Treatment (Average Frequency of Following) Symmetric-BoS Modified-BoS Chicken-Public
Symmetric-BoS (9313%) −
Modified-BoS (8854%) 01986 −
Chicken-Public (7844%) 00161 00542 −
Chicken-Private (7188%) 00039 00065 01994
Table 15: -values for Diﬀerences in Following Recommendations for Each Pair of Treatments
Table 15 indicates significant diﬀerences between the games of Chicken and (both versions of) the
BoS, at least at 10% level of significance. Chicken-Private is diﬀerent from the two treatments involving
the BoS at 1% level of significance. However, there is no diﬀerence between the two versions of BoS,
and also between two treatments involving the game of Chicken.
To test the possible diﬀerences among the treatments, we run a Probit regression with robust
standard errors clustered on independent matching groups, using 3840 (48 x 20 x 4) individual obser-
vations from 20 periods of all four treatments. Our dependent variable here is a binary variable called
Follow that takes value 1 if the recommendation is followed in the data and 0 otherwise. Keeping the
Symmetric-BoS as the baseline for comparison as earlier, the independent variables involving three
treatments are dummy variables called ModifiedBoS, ChickenPublic and ChickenPrivate. The variable
Period takes integer values from 1 to 20 while Recommendation takes value 0 when the recommendation
for any individual is  and 1 when it is  . The variables ModifiedBoS*Period, ChickenPublic*Period
and ChickenPrivate*Period are products of the two named variables. We report the marginal eﬀects
from this Probit regression in Table 16 below.
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Dependent Variable: Follow = 1, if recommendation is followed; = 0, otherwise
Number of Observations: 3840; Pseudo 2 = 00711
Independent Variables Marginal Eﬀects Robust Standard Errors -values
ModifiedBoS −007 006 0221
ChickenPublic −013∗ 007 0069
ChickenPrivate −011∗ 006 0084
Period 001∗∗ 000 0014
ModifiedBoS*Period 000 000 0942
ChickenPublic*Period −000 000 0219
ChickenPrivate*Period −001∗∗∗ 000 0003
Recommendation 005∗ 002 0050
Note: ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level and ∗∗∗ at 1% the level.
Table 16: Probit Regression on Diﬀerences in Following Recommendations Among Treatments
From Table 16, we observe significant diﬀerences among our four treatments, from the marginal ef-
fects of the variablesModifiedBoS, ChickenPublic and ChickenPrivate. The signs of these eﬀects suggest
that following recommendations significantly decreases from the Symmetric-BoS to the Chicken-Public
and Chicken-Private treatments. Our second null hypothesis, thus hereby, has been rejected; we pro-
vide evidences in favour of the alternative hypothesis that individuals follow recommendations more
in the game of Symmetric BoS than in the game of Chicken. We also note that the Probit regression
does not indicate any statistical significance of the diﬀerences between two versions of the BoS. We
summarise our main finding below.
Result 2 There are significant diﬀerences in following recommendations between the games of Sym-
metric BoS and Chicken. Individuals follow recommendations more in the game of Symmetric
BoS than in the game of Chicken.
4.3 Hypothesis 3: Following  or 
Our results (Results 1 and 2) from the previous subsections indicate that there are significant diﬀerences
in coordination and in following recommendations between the games of Symmetric BoS and Chicken.
Table 14 in the previous subsection indeed indicates that there are diﬀerences between following two
diﬀerent recommendations in each of the treatments; recommendation  appears to be followed more
than  from either devices for the game of Chicken, whereas recommendation  seems to be followed
more than  in both versions of the BoS.
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We now focus on the factors that may have aﬀected the individuals’ decisions to follow recommen-
dations, within each treatment. For this exercise, we have run three Probit regressions with robust
standard errors clustered on independent matching groups, using the 960 (48 x 20) individual obser-
vations for each treatment separately.
In each regression, the dependent variable is Follow which is a binary variable that takes value
1 if the recommendation is followed and 0 otherwise, while the independent variables are Period,
Recommendation and Recommendation*Period, as described in the previous subsection. Table 17
presents the marginal eﬀects for all the independent variables (with the respective robust standard
errors in parentheses) for each regression.
No. of Obs. (each): 960; Dependent Variable: Follow = 1 if recommendation followed and = 0 ow
Ind. Var./Mar. Eﬀ. (se) Symmetric-BoS Modified-BoS Chicken-Public Chicken-Private
Period 000∗∗ (000) 001∗∗∗ (000) 001 (000) −001 (001)
Recommendation −006∗ (003) −001 (003) 021∗ (011) 024∗∗∗ (009)
Recommendation*Period −000 (000) 000 (000) −000 (001) 052∗∗∗ (014)
Pseudo 2 00521 00250 00522 00355
Table 17: Probit Regressions on Following Recommendations within Each Treatments
What clearly stands out from Table 17 is that the variable Recommendation is statistically sig-
nificant in all treatments apart from the Modified-BoS. One should particularly note here the signs
for this variable that indicate that the probability of following recommendation  (compared to )
significantly increases in the game of Chicken (with the private device) and significantly decreases in
the Symmetric BoS, as also noted earlier in Table 14.
Results 1 and 2 regarding the diﬀerences among the treatments can thus be explained based on the
individuals’ behaviour when they do follow recommendations. Individuals overall do achieve coordina-
tion by following recommendations in all three games; however, they follow a specific recommendation
more than the other in diﬀerent games ( in the Symmetric BoS and  in the game of Chicken).
From the above analysis, we clearly reject our Hypothesis 3. Moreover, we note that marginal
eﬀects of the variable Period are significant in both versions of BoS. We state these results below.
Result 3a Individuals follow recommendation  more than  from the private device in the game of
Chicken.
Result 3b Individuals follow recommendation  more than  from the private device in the game of
Symmetric BoS.
Result 3c Individuals follow recommendations more as the time progresses in both versions of BoS.
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4.4 Not Following: () or (  )
We now analyse Result 1 focusing on individuals’ behavior when they do not follow recommendations
from the public device in three diﬀerent games. Consider a pair of individuals in any of these games.
They may not both follow recommendations and may still coordinate. Indeed, the “disobedient”
strategy of choosing just the opposite of the recommended actions and thereby coordinating is also
a Nash equilibrium in the extended game (Ray 2002). To note this, we first present the average
frequencies of observations in which both individuals actually followed over 20 periods, divided into
five equal four-period blocks for each of the first three treatments separately in Table 18 below.
Treatment/%Both Follow in Periods 1− 4 5− 8 9− 12 13− 16 17− 20 Total
Symmetric-BoS 7813 8542 8854 9479 8854 8708
Modified-BoS 6771 7083 8438 8750 8438 7896
Chicken-Public 5313 5625 6354 6563 6667 6104
Table 18: Average Frequencies of Coordination Using the Public Device in Games
Table 18 indicates that indeed both individuals follow and thus coordinate in all these games. From
the figures in Tables 11 and 18, we can precisely find the frequencies of coordination in these games
without following recommendations from the public device by playing the “disobedient” strategy. For
example, in the game of Chicken, both players do not follow and still coordinate only in 417% of
observations.
Now let us consider the paired observations in which exactly one of the individuals does not follow
recommendation. In such a case, the outcomes may either be () or (  ), regardless of the
recommendation.
We are interested in the observed frequencies of (  ), as it may be viewed as a “cooperative”
alternative to the (pure) Nash outcomes in these games. As a complement to our Result 1 above,
we now consider the frequencies of (  ) in the first three treatments.6 Figure 2 plots the average
frequencies of the outcome (  ), over 20 periods, divided into five equal four-period blocks.
6As earlier, we are not reporting the frequencies for the Chicken-Private treatment here as the private device recom-
mends (  ) (with probability 1
3
). For the sake of completeness, the overall average frequency of (  ) in Chicken-
Private is 3542%.
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Figure 2: Average Frequencies of the Outcome (  ) in all Games with the Public Device
The exact frequencies are presented in Table 19 below.
Treatment/%Cooperation in Periods 1− 4 5− 8 9− 12 13− 16 17− 20 Total
Symmetric-BoS 729 208 104 0 521 313
Modified-BoS 1354 1042 833 625 625 896
Chicken-Public 3125 2917 2604 2604 2083 2667
Table 19: Average Frequencies of the Outcome (  ) in all Games with the Public Device
It is clear from Figure 2 and Table 19 that the outcome (  ) has been selected more often in the
game of Chicken (2667%) than in (either version of) the BoS (313% and 896%, respectively, for the
Symmetric and Modified BoS). As expected, the overall frequencies are very low for the Symmetric
BoS.
Based on a Kruskal-Wallis test, we first find that the frequencies of cooperation are significantly
diﬀerent among these treatments (-value = 00001).Table 20 below reports the corresponding -values
from a Wilcoxon ranksum test performed for each pairwise comparison.
Treatment (Average Frequencies of (  )) Symmetric-BoS Modified-BoS
Symmetric-BoS (313%) −
Modified-BoS (896%) 00222 −
Chicken-Public (2667%) 00038 00080
Table 20: -values for Diﬀerences in (  ) for Each Pair of Treatments
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Clearly, from Table 20, there are significant diﬀerences between the game of Chicken and (both
versions of) the BoS, at 1% level of significance, while two versions of BoS are significantly diﬀerent
from each other at 5% level of significance. As earlier, to assess the diﬀerences among the treatments,
we then run a Probit regression with robust standard errors clustered on independent matching groups,
using 1440 (24 x 20 x 3) paired observations from 20 periods of three treatments pooled together. Our
dependent variable here is a binary variable called Cooperation which takes value 1 if the paired
outcome is (  ) and takes 0, otherwise. Table 21 reports the results from the Probit regression using
the same independent variables as in the regression presented in Table 13.
Dependent Variable: Cooperation = 1, if (  ); = 0, otherwise
Number of Observations: 1440; Pseudo 2 = 01221
Independent Variables Marginal Eﬀects Robust Standard Errors -values
ModifiedBoS 009 006 0127
ChickenPublic 025∗∗ 010 0016
Period −001 000 0157
ModifiedBoS*Period 000 000 0792
ChickenPublic*Period 000 000 0562
PairedRecommendation 001 002 0817
Note: ∗ denotes significance at the 10% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level and ∗∗∗ at 1% the level.
Table 21: Probit Regression on Diﬀerences in Cooperation Among Treatments
Table 21 above presents a mirror image of Result 1; the marginal eﬀect of the variable Chicken-
Private suggests that cooperation significantly increases from the Symmetric-BoS to the game of
Chicken. We summarise this result below.
Result 4 There are significant diﬀerences in achieving “cooperation” between the games of Symmetric
BoS and Chicken, using the public device; individuals “cooperate” significantly more in Chicken
than in Symmetric BoS.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have asked whether coordination can be achieved using recommendations from a
correlation device and have analysed whether or not players followed these randomised recommenda-
tions in order to avoid coordination-failure in 2 x 2 games. Our work has contributed to two distinct
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literatures, one on coordination and the other on correlation by assessing the role of recommendations
in enhancing coordination in diﬀerent 2 x 2 games, using diﬀerent correlated equilibria.
Our paper added to the existing literatures mainly in two respects. First, we have studied a
possible way of coordinating in the well-known paradigm of games like the BoS and Chicken by public
randomisation. The existing literature on coordination problems in games like BoS suggests that
the players require some scheme to coordinate. We have contributed to this literature by analysing
the scheme of a public lottery for three games. Second, we have extended the investigation of the
empirical validity of the concept of correlated equilibrium in diﬀerent 2 x 2 games. We have tested the
robustness of coordination by following recommendations by using diﬀerent games and diﬀerent types
of correlated equilibria. Moreover, we have chosen the correlation devices and the parameters in our
games so that we can compare the individuals’ behaviour in diﬀerent treatments. We have provided
a full explanation of the required criteria and thereby completely characterised the payoﬀ parameters
in our chosen games. Based on our set-up, our null hypotheses are that we should not observe any
diﬀerences among our treatments in terms of coordination and in following recommendations.
We have found that overall coordination was achieved and individuals did follow recommendations,
as in the existing literature. However, we have rejected all of our hypotheses, as we have found
significant diﬀerences in coordination and following recommendations between the games of Symmetric
BoS and Chicken. We have also analysed some of the factors that may have aﬀected individuals’
decisions to follow recommendations in our experiment and thus have explained our results. We have
observed players follow recommendation  more than  in the game of Chicken with the private
device, and  more than  in both versions of BoS. We also have considered the frequencies of the
outcome (  ) in diﬀerent games and have noted that the diﬀerences in these games indeed have come
from the outcome (  ) that may seem to be a “cooperative” outcome, particularly in the game of
Chicken. Our finding suggests that when the players do not follow recommendations, they perhaps try
to achieve the “cooperative” outcome (  ) in diﬀerent games, particularly, in the game of Chicken.
The outcome (  ) thus causes the diﬀerences documented in Results 1 and 2.
For future research, one may consider a few diﬀerent directions. First, this paper considers only
direct or canonical correlation devices. Ray (2002) analyses diﬀerent non-canonical correlation devices
to implement a correlated equilibrium. In our framework, one may wish to run further experiments
with recommendations from such non-direct correlation devices. Second, one may consider running
similar treatments using a coarser notion of correlation, such as, the coarse correlated equilibrium (as
introduced by Moulin and Vial 1978 and recently used by Ray and Sen Gupta 2013) in which the
players are given a choice of committing to the correlation device. Finally, the games discussed here
may be useful to analyse direct communication (Moreno and Wooders 1998) between the two players.
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6 APPENDICES
We report the full instructions only for the Chicken-Private treatment here. The instructions for
the Chicken-Public diﬀer from that for the Chicken-Private only in the Recommendations section, as
reported below, while the instructions for the Symmetric-BoS and the Modified-BoS diﬀer from that
for the Chicken-Public only in the Your Decision Problem section (and subsequently, in the Computer
Screen), in an obvious way. These instructions have been omitted here and are available upon request.
6.1 Instructions (for the Chicken-Private Treatment)
All participants in this session have the following identical instructions.
Welcome to this experiment, and thank you for participating. From now onwards please do not
talk to any other participants until the experiment is finished. You will be given five minutes to read
these instructions. Then we will ask you to complete a brief test to ensure that you have understood
them, before starting the experiment itself.
Your Decision Problem
In this experiment, you are asked to make a simple choice, in each of 20 successive rounds. In each
round you earn a number of points, as described below. The total number of points you accumulate
over the 20 rounds determines your final money payment, at a conversion rate of 10 points = 30 pence.
In each round, you are randomly paired with another participant, diﬀerent from one round to
the next, whom we call your counterpart for that round. You and your various counterparts remain
anonymous to each other at all times, and you have no direct contact with each other during the
experiment. In each round, you and your counterpart each have to choose one of two alternatives, 
and  . You do so independently of each other and without any communication. So, at the moment you
make your own choice, you do not know what is your counterpart’s choice. You and your counterpart’s
choices together determine the points you each earn from that round, as in the following table.
Your Counterpart’s Choice
Your Choice
 
 2 2 17 11
 11 17 14 14
The first number in each cell indicates your points, and the second your counterpart’s points. For
example, if in some round you choose  while your counterpart chooses  then from that round you
will earn 17 points and your counterpart will earn 11 points. Notice that, whatever your counterpart’s
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choice, you earn more points by choosing diﬀerently from your counterpart. Thus, if your counterpart’s
choice is  then you earn more points by choosing  rather than  (giving you 11 points rather than
2), while if your counterpart’s choice is  then you earn more points by choosing  rather than  (17
points rather than 14). Notice also that if your counterpart’s choice is equally likely to be  or  ,
then you earn more points on average by choosing  (125 being the average of 11 and 14) rather than
 (95 being the average of 2 and 17). As you can see from the table, everything is symmetric between
you and your counterpart. So, exactly the same considerations as above apply for your counterpart,
to whom of course you are the counterpart, and who will have read these exact same instructions.
Recommendations
At the start of each round, you and your counterpart are each given recommendations for your
choices, generated randomly by the computer. It is entirely up to you, in any round, whether or not
to follow the recommendation you are given. The points that you earn depend only on the actual
choices made by you and your counterpart, as described on the previous page, irrespective of the
recommendations. In each round, you are informed of only of the recommendation for you. But, as
explained below, you may be able to infer something about your counterpart’s recommendation.
The recommendations are generated randomly by the computer in each round, programmed such
that there are only three equally-likely possibilities:
• there is a 13 chance that you are recommended to choose , and your counterpart recommended
to choose  ;
• there is a 13 chance that you are recommended to choose  , and your counterpart recommended
to choose ;
• there is a 13 chance that you are both recommended to choose  .
It will never happen that you are both recommended to choose . These possibilities are sum-
marised as follows:
Recommendation for You Recommendation for Your Counterpart Probability
  0
  13
  13
  13
Notice that if the recommendation for you is then you can infer that the recommendation for your
counterpart is  , and if the recommendation for you is  then you can infer that the recommendation
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for your counterpart is equally likely to be  or  . It is entirely up to you whether or not to follow your
recommendation in any round. But notice that if your counterpart follows his or her recommendation
then (on average) you earn more points by following yours, than by not doing so. This is because:
• if your recommendation is  then your counterpart’s must be  , and if your counterpart chooses
 then you earn more points by choosing  rather than  ;
• if your recommendation is  then your counterpart’s is equally likely to be  or  , and if your
counterpart is equally likely to choose  or  then you earn more points on average by choosing
 rather than .
However, if your counterpart does not follow his or her recommendation then it is possible that you
will earn more points by also not following yours. This is because, in any round, it is always better
for you to choose diﬀerently from your counterpart, as explained on the previous page, whatever the
recommendations you have each received.
The Computer Screen
The main screen for each round looks like this. It includes the payoﬀ table, which is the same in
each round, and below it the recommendation for you in that round, which is random and may vary
from one round to the next. Shown here, to illustrate, is a recommendation for you to choose  .
To make your choice you simply select the appropriate button and then click on Submit. You may
then have to wait a few moments until all participants have made their choices, after which will appear
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on-screen the results for you and your counterpart in that round. On your desk is a Record Sheet on
which you can keep a note of these results, if you wish to. After all the participants have read their
results and clicked Continue, the main screen for the next round will appear, again as shown above.
At the End of the Experiment
When all 20 rounds have been completed, you will be asked to complete a brief on-screen question-
naire, which provides useful supplementary (anonymous) information for us. Having completed the
questionnaire, you will see a final screen reporting your total points accumulated over the 20 rounds
and the corresponding £ payment. Please then wait for further instructions from the experimenter,
who will pay you in cash before you leave. While waiting, please complete the receipt form which you
will also find on your desk. We need these receipts for our own accounts.
The results from this experiment will be used solely for academic research. Participants will remain
completely anonymous in any publications connected with this experiment. Thank you for participat-
ing. We hope that you enjoy the experiment, and that you will be willing to participate again in our
future experiments.
6.2 Test
After reading the instructions, you will be asked to complete this brief test, to ensure you have
understood them, before starting the experiment itself. You may look again at the instructions while
answering these questions.
For questions 1-4, write the answers.
1. If you choose  and your counterpart chooses , how many points do you earn in that round?
2. If you choose  and your counterpart chooses , how many points does your counterpart earn
in that round?
3. If you choose  and your counterpart chooses , how many points do you earn in that round?
4. If over the 20 rounds you accumulate a total of 100 points, what is your final cash payment (in
£) for the experiment?
For questions 5-8, circle either True or False.
5. Your counterpart is the same person in each round. True / False
6. If the recommendation for you is  , then your counterpart’s recommendation must be . True
/ False
7. Whatever your counterpart chooses, you always get more points by following your recommen-
dation. True / False
8. In any publications arising from this experiment the participants will be completely anonymous.
True / False
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Thank you for completing this test. Please leave this completed sheet face up on your desk. The
experimenter will come round to check that you have the correct answers. If any of your answers are
incorrect then the experimenter will give you some explanatory feedback.
6.3 Record Sheet
Use of this sheet is optional. It is provided so that you can keep a record of the results in each
round, as reported on your computer screen at the end of the round. This may be useful to you in
considering your decisions in subsequent rounds. In each cell in the table below, simply circle  or 
as appropriate, while the information is still on your screen at the end of that round, before clicking
Continue.
Round My Reco. Choice Counterpart’s Reco. Choice My Point
1        
2        
3        
4        
5        
6        
7        
8        
9        
10        
11        
12        
13        
14        
15        
16        
17        
18        
19        
20        
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